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Facebook Fatalities: Students, 
Social Networking, and the First 
Amendment 
 
Thomas Wheeler* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Phoebe Prince, a recent Irish immigrant, hanged 
herself Jan. 14 after nearly three months of 
routine torment by students at South Hadley 
High School, via text message, and through the 
social networking site, Facebook. . . . 
Northwestern District Attorney Elizabeth 
Scheibel said Prince‟s bullying was the result of a 
romantic relationship she had with one of the 
male suspects that ended weeks prior to her 
suicide.1 
 
District Attorney Scheibel stated “[t]he investigation 
revealed relentless activity directed toward Phoebe, designed to 
humiliate her and to make it impossible for her to remain at 
school. . . . The bullying, for her, became intolerable. 
Nevertheless, the actions—or inactions—of some adults at the 
school are troublesome.”2 According to the district attorney, 
“school administrators knew of the bullying but none would be 
charged with criminal conduct.”3 
This is not an isolated incident. Facebook celebrated its 
 
  * Mr. Wheeler is a member of the National School Boards Association 
Board of Directors and Chairman of the Council of School Attorneys. He is a 
partner with Frost Brown Todd LLC. 
1. Russell Goldman, Teens Indicted After Allegedly Taunting Girl Who 
Hanged Herself, ABC NEWS, Mar. 29, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/TheLaw/teens-charged-bullying-mass-girl-
kill/story?id=10231357. 
2. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
3. Id. 
1
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sixth birthday on February 4, 2010 and announced at that time 
that it had over 400 million members, making it the equivalent 
of the world‟s third largest country, ahead of industrial 
countries such as the United States (308 million), Russia (141 
million), and Japan (127 million). Indeed, Facebook‟s 
population only trailed China (1.34 billion) and India (1.2 
billion).4 The rate of growth for Facebook has been exponential, 
with approximately 700,000 new users a day and 21 million 
new users per month.5 At this rate, Facebook will soon be 
larger than any other country in the world.6 
This explosive growth in social networking impacts all 
segments of society, but given the youthful nature of many 
Facebook users (54.3 percent of total users are ages eighteen to 
twenty-four),7 the impact on students is dramatic and 
occasionally tragic. Phoebe Prince was not the first teen suicide 
victim of cyberbullying; there have been numerous other 
documented instances and they seem to be on the rise.8 
Because these attacks take place in the cyberworld, the 
traditional pupil disciplinary framework is ill-suited to deal 
with this behavior. As the South Hadley School Superintendent 
noted in response to the suicide: “I think the principal did 
everything he could. . . . Everyone expects the schools to solve 
these problems, but we don‟t have magic-bullet solutions to 
 
4. Pam Dyer, The Facebook Juggernaut: Exponential Growth + World‟s 
Leading News Reader?, PAMORAMA, (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://www.pamorama.net/2010/02/10/the-facebook-juggernaut-exponential-
growth-worlds-leading-news-reader/. 
5. Id. (Just a year ago, Facebook had 150 million users and the increase 
of 250 million users over that period represents the statistics given.). 
6. Id. 
7. Peter Corbett, Facebook Demographics And Statistics Report 2010 – 
145% Growth In 1 Year, ISTRATEGYLABS, (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.istrategylabs.com/2010/01/facebook-demographics-and-statistics-
report-2010-145-growth-in-1-year/. 
8. See, e.g., Steve Bird, Holly Grogan, 15, Leapt to her Death „After Abuse 
from Facebook Bullies‟, THE TIMES, September 21, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6841908.ece; Oren Yaniv, 
Long Island Teen‟s Suicide Linked to Cruel Cyberbullies, Formspring.me Site: 
Police, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, March 25, 2010, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/03/25/2010-03-
25_li_teens_suicide_linked_to_cruel_cyberbullies_police.html (“Alexis 
Pilkington, 17, a West Islip soccer star, took her own life Sunday following 
vicious taunts on social networking sites . . . .”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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how kids behave.”9 Indeed, while the school administrators 
were criticized in Prince, these same administrators are also 
frequently the target of similar vicious cyber attacks. In one 
recent case, a fourteen-year-old eighth grader at Blue 
Mountain Middle School created a fictitious profile of her 
principal that included his photograph from the school‟s 
website, as well as profanity-laced statements that he was a 
sex addict and pedophile.10 In another case, a student in 
Pennsylvania created a website entitled “Teacher Sux.”11 The 
website described the student‟s math teacher in obscene terms 
and included pictures of the teacher‟s severed head dripping 
blood, a picture of her face morphing into Hitler, and a 
solicitation for funds to hire a hit man to kill her under the 
caption “Why Should She Die?”12 
On the eve of the anniversary of Phoebe Prince‟s tragic 
death, the purpose of this Article is to look for clues to that 
“magic-bullet” and to try and craft a workable legal framework 
to assist students, parents, and school administrators in 
navigating the complex legal waters that surround the 
regulation of off-campus cyberspeech. Utilizing Supreme Court 
precedent in traditional First Amendment student speech 
cases, this Article examines the application of that traditional 
framework to cases involving cyberbullying. The vehicle for 
doing this will be to examine two recent Third Circuit cases 
that involve very similar facts but resulted in dramatically 
different outcomes: J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District,13 where the Court found that a school could discipline 
a student for harassing off-campus speech on a social 
networking site, and Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District,14 which found that a school could not discipline 
 
9. Peter Schworm, Schools Head Defends Response to Bullying, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, April 1, 2010, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/04/01/schools_
head_defends_response_to_bullying/?page=2. 
10. J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290-91 
(3d Cir. 2010), vacated en banc, (Apr. 9, 2010). 
11. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. No. 415, 807 A.2d 847, 
850-51 (Pa. 2002). 
12. Id. at 851. 
13. 593 F.3d 286. 
14. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010). 
3
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a student for off-campus cyberspeech almost identical to that in 
Snyder. Recognizing the obvious conflict between these two 
panel decisions, the Third Circuit granted rehearing and the 
two cases were reheard en banc on June 3, 2010.15 These cases 
are likely heading to the Supreme Court, and this Article will 
conclude with some suggestions regarding specific areas where 
clarification from the Supreme Court could provide that “magic 
bullet” to avoid further tragedies like the Phoebe Prince 
suicide. 
 
II. The Tinker/Bethel/Hazelwood Trilogy 
 
Any examination of student free speech rights must 
necessarily start with the seminal Supreme Court case of 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.16 
In Tinker, students wore black armbands to school in order to 
protest the Vietnam War.17 The school banned the armbands 
under its dress code and the students challenged the policy as 
violative of their First Amendment rights.18 One of the key 
factors in the challenge was the fact that, although the school 
banned the black armbands under its dress code and 
disciplined the students wearing that symbol, it did not ban 
other potentially disruptive symbols such as a black cross that 
could have evoked images of Nazi Germany.19 
In overturning the ban, the Supreme Court found that 
wearing black armbands was expressive conduct protected by 
the First Amendment and stated that “[i]t can hardly be 
argued that . . . students . . . shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”20 It 
determined that, absent the showing of a compelling interest, 
 
15. Ruthann Robson, Third Circuit en banc Hears Oral Arguments About 
Myspace.com, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG, (June 3, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/06/third-circuit-en-banc-hears-
oral-arguments-about-myspacecom.html. 
16. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
17. Id. at 504. 
18. See id. 
19. Id. at 510. 
20. Id. at 506. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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the school could not ban the armbands.21 In doing so the Court 
crafted a two-pronged test.22 Under this test, the court first 
determines whether student speech is protected under the 
First Amendment.23 In determining whether the speech is 
protected, the court considers whether the student intended to 
convey a particularized message and whether that message is 
indeed the type of speech entitled to protection.24 It then 
considers whether there is a reasonable likelihood that those 
who viewed the speech would understand this message.25 If 
both of these conditions are met then the speech is entitled to 
constitutional protection and the court moves on to the second 
inquiry: whether the school can demonstrate a sufficiently 
compelling interest to permit it to restrict the protected speech, 
i.e. a substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities.26 In Tinker, the Supreme Court found that the 
armbands were intended to and did in fact convey a 
particularized anti-Vietnam war message and thus constituted 
speech protected by the First Amendment.27 The Supreme 
Court then determined that the school failed to show that the 
mere wearing of the armbands at school posed a serious threat 
of material and substantial interference with the operation of 
the school and therefore there was no compelling interest in 
restricting the speech.28 The ban was overturned as a 
 
21. See id. 
22. Id. at 509. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. There are certain types of speech that are not protected 
regardless of the circumstances. The classic example is the “fighting words” 
doctrine most recently explored by the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (burning a cross is the symbolic equivalent of 
fighting words as it is speech designed to elicit an immediate violent 
response). However, more pertinent to this discussion are “true threats.” 
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 512-13. 
28. Id. Although it is true that students do not shed their constitutional 
rights at the school house gate, id. at 506, it is also true that the 
constitutional rights of students in public schools “„are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,‟ and must be „applied 
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.‟” Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal citation omitted). 
5
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consequence.29 
Thus, the high water mark for student free speech rights, 
not surprisingly, came from the Warren Court in the 1960s.30 
Since that time, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed 
student First Amendment rights more critically through the 
prism of the unique needs of the Nation‟s public school system, 
generally coming down on the side of the school. 
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,31 the issue was 
slightly different. Although Fraser also involved on-campus 
speech, the question presented was whether the school could 
discipline a student for giving a nominating speech for a fellow 
senior that referred to the candidate in terms of “an elaborate, 
graphic and explicit sexual metaphor” in front of six hundred 
students.32 The Supreme Court, while reaffirming the 
continuing vitality of Tinker, nevertheless indicated that 
student expressive rights at school were not co-extensive with 
those of adults outside of school.33 The court refused to protect 
student speech when it deemed that speech to intrude upon the 
educational mission of the school.34 In so doing, the court made 
it clear that vulgar, indecent, or disruptive speech can be 
punished and prohibited in classrooms, assemblies, and other 
school-sponsored educational activities, as such speech runs 
counter to the educational objectives of schools.35 In a later case 
the Supreme Court distilled two lessons from Fraser: 
 
 
29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
30. In 1969, just a few months after Tinker was decided, the “Warren 
Court” was no more. Chief Justice Earl Warren resigned at the conclusion of 
the 1968-1969 term and was replaced by Nixon appointee Warren Burger. 
Justice Fortas was replaced by another Nixon appointee, Harry Blackmun. 
31. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
32. Id. at 677-78. 
33. Id. at 682. 
34. Id. at 685. 
35. Id. at 684-85 (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public 
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public 
discourse. Indeed, the „fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system‟ disfavor the use of terms of debate highly 
offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are 
inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is 
truly the „work of the schools.‟”). Id. at 683 (internal citation omitted). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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For present purposes, it is enough to distill from 
Fraser two basic principles. First, Fraser‟s 
holding demonstrates that “the constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings.” Had Fraser delivered 
the same speech in a public forum outside the 
school context, it would have been protected. In 
school, however, Fraser‟s First Amendment 
rights were circumscribed “in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.” 
Second, Fraser established that the mode of 
analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute. 
Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly 
did not conduct the “substantial disruption” 
analysis prescribed by Tinker.36 
 
The final case in the trilogy is Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.37 Unlike Tinker and Bethel, where the issue was 
whether the school had to tolerate certain types of student 
speech, the question in Hazelwood was whether the school 
could be forced to sponsor such speech.38 A student newspaper 
sought to publish articles on sexual activities and birth control 
but, upon review, the principal removed the articles because he 
felt that the sexual references were inappropriate for younger 
students and contained personally identifiable information.39 
The students sued, alleging that the removal of the articles 
violated their First Amendment rights.40 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, distinguishing Tinker where “[t]he question whether 
the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular 
student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is 
different from the question whether the First Amendment 
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student 
 
36. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007) (internal citation 
omitted). 
37. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
38. Id. at 270-71. 
39. See id. at 262-64. 
40. Id. at 264. 
7
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speech.”41 The Supreme Court decided that it did not and 
concluded: 
 
[T]he standard articulated in Tinker for 
determining when a school may punish student 
expression need not also be the standard for 
determining when a school may refuse to lend its 
name and resources to the dissemination of 
student expression. . . . Educators do not offend 
the First Amendment . . . so long as their actions 
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.42 
 
These three seminal Supreme Court cases all involved 
some form of on-campus speech. By comparison, the Phoebe 
Prince case involved mostly off-campus cyberspeech. While the 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, it did 
brush up against it in Morse v. Frederick.43 That case was 
widely viewed at the time as involving off-campus speech, and 
school attorneys hoped that it would provide a glimpse into a 
legal framework for addressing student cyberspeech. 
In Morse, a student unfurled a banner with the words 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” across the street from the school after 
being released to watch the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay as it 
passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games 
in Salt Lake City, Utah.44 The student was suspended for ten 
days because the principal believed that the banner encouraged 
illegal drug use in violation of established school policy.45 
The student challenged the ban, arguing that the speech 
on his banner was protected under the First Amendment and 
that the school had no right to restrict his off-campus speech.46 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts did not find the 
case particularly difficult. He viewed the student‟s actions, 
 
41. Id. at 270-71. 
42. Id. at 272-73. 
43. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
44. Id. at 397. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 399. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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despite taking place across the street from the school, as on-
campus speech, writing: 
 
At the outset, we reject Frederick‟s argument 
that this is not a school speech case—as has 
every other authority to address the question. 
The event occurred during normal school hours. 
It was sanctioned by Principal Morse “as an 
approved social event or class trip,” and the 
school district‟s rules expressly provide that 
pupils in “approved social events and class trips 
are subject to district rules for student 
conduct.”47 
 
Given the possible “pro-drug interpretation of the 
banner”48 and the fact that the banner was unfurled at a school 
sponsored event, Chief Justice Roberts felt that the case fell 
squarely within the parameters of Fraser‟s educational mission 
criteria: “The question thus becomes whether a principal may, 
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech 
at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.”49 
This decision notwithstanding, citing Porter v. Ascension 
Parish School Board,50 Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged 
that “[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to 
when courts should apply school speech precedents, but not on 
these facts.”51 Porter involved a fourteen year old student who 
sketched a picture of a siege on his school by various armed 
persons.52 The sketch also contained obscenities and racial 
epithets directed at fellow students.53 He did the sketch at 
home and stored it in a closet.54 Two years later, his younger 
 
47. Id. at 400-01 (internal citation omitted). 
48. Id. at 402. 
49. Id. at 403. 
50. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
51. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (citing Porter, 393 F.3d at 615 n.22). 
52. Porter, 393 F.3d at 611. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
9
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brother used the same sketch pad and took it to school.55 
Students showed the siege sketch to administrators stating 
that “Miss Diane, look, they‟re going to blow up EAHS.”56 
Administrators called the student, then sixteen years old, down 
to the office where he was searched.57 During the search they 
“found a box cutter with a one-half inch exposed blade in his 
wallet. The officials also found notebooks in Adam‟s bag 
containing references to death, drugs, sex, depictions of gang 
symbols, and a fake ID.”58 The Fifth Circuit held that the 
school could not discipline the student for the sketch even 
though it ended up on campus: 
 
Given the unique facts of the present case, we 
decline to find that Adam‟s drawing constitutes 
student speech on the school premises. Adam‟s 
drawing was completed in his home, stored for 
two years, and never intended by him to be 
brought to campus. He took no action that would 
increase the chances that his drawing would find 
its way to school; he simply stored it in a closet 
where it remained until, by chance, it was 
unwittingly taken to Galvez Middle School by his 
brother. This is not exactly speech on campus or 
even speech directed at the campus.59 
 
These cases frame any debate over student cyberspeech 
with the issue appearing to turn on, as noted in Morse, whether 
the speech occurs at school.60 Unfortunately, this begs the 
question in the cyberspeech arena. What does “at school” 
mean? Porter seems to hold that just because the speech 
inadvertently comes on to school grounds, this does not mean it 
is student speech at school. In the case of cyberbullying 
directed at a student like Phoebe Prince, is a text sent to her 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 611-12. 
58. Id. at 612. 
59. Id. at 615. 
60. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007) (discussing whether 
student speech is protected while at a school event). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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phone which she views at school student speech “at school”? 
What if she accessed her Facebook account on a school 
computer only to find a hateful message? Is that student 
speech “at school”? Is it enough that a student simply throws 
the speech out into cyberspace from home without regard to 
where and how it might be accessed, and when it is accessed at 
school, does it then become student speech “at school”? Given 
this unsettled legal framework, is it any surprise that the 
administrators in the Phoebe Prince case may have been slow 
to act in disciplining the alleged cyberbullies for their texts and 
Facebook postings? 
 
III.  Regulating Off-Campus Speech: Underground 
Newspapers61 
 
Perhaps the closest historical analogy to web-based 
student Internet speech can be found in the off-campus 
newspaper cases which have been litigated since the mid-
1960s. Notwithstanding Porter, a majority of these cases 
permit schools to regulate off-campus student speech when it is 
directed at school and comes on to school grounds or causes a 
disruption at school. Thus, in Sullivan v. Houston Independent 
School District,62 a student was punished for an underground 
newspaper distributed off-campus, but at the entrance to the 
school which was then brought onto school grounds.63 The 
student sued the school claiming that the punishment violated 
his First Amendment rights.64 The Fifth Circuit found that the 
student flagrantly disregarded established school regulations, 
never having attempted to comply with a prior submission rule 
which was the product of an extensive and good-faith effort to 
formulate a valid student conduct code. Indeed, the court noted 
that the student had openly and repeatedly defied the 
principal‟s request to submit the paper for review and instead 
 
61. Portions of these materials have been previously published in 
Thomas E. Wheeler, Lessons from the Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of 
Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 
EDUC. L. REP. 227 (2007). 
62. 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). 
63. Id. at 1074. 
64. Id. at 1072. 
11
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resorted to profane epithets.65 A key factor in this case was the 
finding that the papers were “distributed . . . off campus in a 
manner calculated to result in their presence on the campus.”66 
As a consequence, notwithstanding the fact that there was no 
disruption, the Fifth Circuit denied the student‟s request for 
relief, noting that “[t]oday we merely recognize the right of 
school authorities to punish students for the flagrant disregard 
of established school regulations; we ask only that the student 
seeking equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional actions 
by school officials come into court with clean hands.”67 
In Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High School,68 
several students distributed an unofficial newspaper, Tour de 
Farce, which they had written off of school grounds but 
distributed on campus.69 Based on the content of some of the 
articles that encouraged vandalism at the school, the principal 
suspended some of the authors.70 In dismissing the First 
Amendment challenge the Minnesota district court found that 
there was a substantial likelihood of material disruption 
surrounding the distribution of the papers satisfying the 
second prong of Tinker, that “Tour de Farce contains language 
that is more sexually explicit, indecent, and lewd than Fraser‟s 
strictly metaphorical speech,” and that it advocated violence 
against the teachers.71 Consequently, the discipline was 
 
65. Id. at 1075-76. 
66. Id. at 1073. 
67. Id. at 1077. 
68. 686 F.Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987). 
69. Id. at 1389. 
70. Id. at 1390. 
71. Id. at 1393. See also Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., where 
students used obscene and vulgar language in an underground newspaper 
published off-campus and distributed to students just outside the main 
campus gate. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The school suspended them 
for ten (10) days and the students challenged the suspension under the First 
Amendment. Id. Although pre-Fraser, the court used the same profane/vulgar 
analysis to find that the school had the authority to punish the students for 
these newspapers that found their way on to campus. Id. In Pangle v. Bend-
Lapine Sch. Dist., a student wrote and distributed a newsletter on school 
grounds that included a list of acts that he “would like to see happen at 
school . . . to the people who „run‟ it.” 10 P.3d 275, 277 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
The list described, in part, “feed[ing] snake bite antidote or Visine to 
someone, as well as [b]lowing things up and bomb threats.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted). He was disciplined for the newsletter and challenged that 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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upheld. 
In contrast with these two cases is Thomas v. Board of 
Education of Granville Central School District.72 In that case, 
several students modeled an off-campus newspaper on 
National Lampoon and included articles on “masturbation and 
prostitution,” among other things.73 A teacher assisted in the 
efforts and advised the assistant principal of the general 
nature of the project but not the specifics.74 The students were 
directed by the assistant principal not to offend or hurt others 
and to keep it off campus.75 However, “the publication was 
stored, with [the teacher‟s] permission, in his classroom closet. 
At the end of each school day, the students retrieved a number 
of copies and sold each one for twenty-five cents to classmates 
at Stewart‟s, a store in Granville.”76 Copies eventually made it 
onto campus and came to the attention of the school 
administration when a teacher confiscated a copy from a 
student.77 Noting that “all but an insignificant amount of 
relevant activity in this case was deliberately designed to take 
place beyond the schoolhouse gate,” the Second Circuit found 
no nexus with the school and thus no basis for disciplining the 
students.78 
The most recent off-campus newspaper case involved a 
high school student who was expelled after his article about 
how to “hack” into the school‟s computers was published in an 
underground newspaper.79 In Boucher v. School Board of the 
School District of Greenfield, students published an 
 
discipline, in part, under the First Amendment. Id. at 277-78. The Oregon 
Court of Appeals treated this as school speech and applied the Fraser 
analysis rejecting the student‟s argument that “the use of vulgar or 
threatening language not resulting in actual disruption is not subject to 
discipline.” Id. at 286. 
72. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
73. Id. at 1045. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 1050. 
79. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 821 
(7th Cir. 1998). 
13
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underground newspaper off campus entitled The Last.80 “The 
inaugural issue . . . provocatively explained that The Last was 
intended to „ruffle a few feathers and jump-start some to 
action.‟”81 The June issue of The Last was distributed in 
bathrooms, lockers, and the cafeteria at Greenfield High School 
and contained an article, entitled So You Want To Be A Hacker, 
that purported to “tell everyone how to hack the school[„]s gay 
ass computers.”82 
Upon investigation the school determined that the author 
of the article was Mr. Boucher and suspended him pending 
expulsion for “endanger[ing] school property.”83 Boucher 
challenged the discipline, contending that it violated his First 
Amendment rights.84 Using the first prong of Tinker, the school 
argued that the article was not protected speech under the 
First Amendment because it disclosed restricted access codes in 
violation of Wisconsin‟s computer crimes law.85 The Seventh 
Circuit focused instead on the second factor in the Tinker test, 
whether the speech was disruptive. Boucher argued that 
because the newspaper was circulated, the school had to show 
“actual” harm to the school in order to punish him.86 The 
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument: “The Court has 
indicated that in the case of student expression, the relevant 
test is whether school authorities „have reason to believe‟ that 
the expression will be disruptive.”87 The Seventh Circuit went 
on to note that: 
 
[T]he article “does encourage activity which could 
be invasive and destructive to the School‟s 
computer system and the information on it.” It is 
largely irrelevant that the article may not have 
actually (and in hindsight) provided as valuable 
advice as purported or that the information 
 
80. Id. at 822. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. (quotations omitted). 
83. Id. at 823. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 825. 
86. Id. at 828. 
87. Id. at 827. 
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disclosed may not have been as secret as 
represented; on the facts before us a reader 
might reasonably take the article at face value.88 
 
Boucher also argued that he should not be punished 
because he wrote the article off school grounds.89 The Seventh 
Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it noted 
that “the article was in fact distributed on campus” and thus it 
did not matter where it was actually written.90 Second, the 
court noted that “the article advocates on-campus activity” 
which gave a sufficient nexus to the school to permit it to 
regulate the speech.91 
 
IV.  Cyberharassment in the Courts 
 
It is interesting to note that since the advent of the 
Internet, the vast majority of cyberspeech cases involve not 
student/student harassment as in the Phoebe Prince case, but 
instead involve student/administrator harassment. This may 
be because most of this activity is directed at school 
administrators, or perhaps simply that administrators are 
more likely to act when their own ox is gored. 
In reviewing the propriety of the student‟s suspension the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 
 
However, while the freedom of speech is 
rightfully cherished, it is also clear that this 
right of free speech “is not absolute at all times 
and under all circumstances.” For example, 
certain types of speech can be regulated if they 
are likely to inflict unacceptable harm. These 
narrow categories of unprotected speech include 
“fighting words,” speech that incites others to 
imminent lawless action, obscenity, certain types 
 
88. Id. at 828. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 829. 
91. Id. 
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of defamatory speech, and “true threats.”92 
 
The first prong of the Tinker test seems to adapt well to 
the Internet context as it simply looks to the message being 
communicated and analyzes whether it is protected speech.93 
This analysis really does not vary with the mode of the speech. 
Whether a student writes “I am against the Vietnam War,” 
shouts it as a slogan at a protest, wears it on her arm, or posts 
it on a website, the message remains the same. For First 
Amendment purposes much student cyberspeech would be 
protected as long as it is not disruptive and does not fall into 
one of several categories, such as “true threats,” that the 
Supreme Court has recognized as being unprotected. 
In J.S. ex rel. H.S., the school argued that the student‟s 
website was not protected speech as it constituted a “true 
threat” in that it contained the teacher‟s severed head and a 
solicitation for funds to hire a hit man.94 The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the 
website did not constitute a “true threat” because it was not 
sent to the teacher and indeed was designed specifically to 
preclude access by teachers and administrators.95 As a 
consequence the court noted, “we conclude that the statements 
made by J.S. did not constitute a true threat, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances present here. We believe that the 
web site, taken as a whole, was a sophomoric, crude, highly 
offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or 
parody.”96 As will be discussed later in this article, J.S. ex rel 
H.S. notwithstanding, most courts have found such comments 
to constitute true threats. Under Tinker, if the statement is a 
true threat then it is not protected free speech, regardless of 
whether it is uttered in school, in a poem at home, or in 
cyberspace.97 
Since the J.S. ex rel. H.S. court found that the speech was 
 
92. Id. at 854 (internal citation omitted). 
93. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
94. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 856-57. 
95. Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 856. 
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not a “true threat,” it determined that the cyberspeech was 
protected by the First Amendment under the first prong of 
Tinker.98 However, under the second prong of Tinker, a school 
may still restrict student speech if it can show that the speech 
is likely to create a substantial or material disruption at 
school.99 The primary factor in this analysis whether there is a 
nexus between the cyberspeech and a potential impact at 
school. “A school need not tolerate student speech that is 
inconsistent with its „basic educational mission,‟ even though 
the government could not censor similar speech outside the 
school.”100 
In J.S. ex rel. H.S. the court squarely addressed the on-
campus/off-campus distinction that the Morse court 
sidestepped and resolved the issue in the school‟s favor: 
 
We find there is a sufficient nexus between the 
web site and the school campus to consider the 
speech as occurring on-campus. While there is no 
dispute that the web site was created off-campus, 
the record clearly reflects that the off-campus 
website was accessed by J.S. at school and was 
shown to a fellow student. . . . Importantly, the 
web site was aimed not at a random audience, 
but at the specific audience of students and 
others connected with this particular School 
District; Mrs. Fulmer and Mr. Kartsotis were the 
subjects of the site. Thus, it was inevitable that 
the contents of the web site would pass from 
students to teachers, inspiring the circulation of 
the web page on school property. We hold that 
where speech that is aimed at a specific school 
and/or its personnel is brought onto school 
campus or accessed at school by its originator, 
the speech will be considered on-campus 
 
98. Id. at 860. 
99. Id. at 861-62. 
100. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) 
(citation omitted). 
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speech.101 
 
The court further noted that: 
 
While the fact that J.S. personally accessed his 
website on school grounds is a strong factor in 
our assessment, we do not discount that one who 
posts school-targeted material in a manner 
known to be freely accessible from school grounds 
may run the risk of being deemed to have 
engaged in on-campus speech, where actual 
accessing by others in fact occurs, depending 
upon the totality of the circumstances 
involved.102 
 
The J.S. ex rel. H.S. approach has the benefit of creating a 
bright-line test for administrators and students. If the website 
is accessed by students at school then the speech will be 
deemed to have taken place on-campus and the school may 
regulate it. The danger this presents for students, 
acknowledged in footnote 12 of the opinion, is that once a 
website is created and placed on the Internet the creator 
cannot control who accesses it and where they do so. Thus, 
even if the creator did not intend the website to be accessed at 
school and even if she actually takes steps to prevent it, if 
someone does access it at school, then the student is at risk. 
Given the nature of the unrestricted speech and the potential 
for harm, this seems to be a reasonable balance of the 
respective interests. 
Once a nexus with the school has been established, the 
second prong of Tinker requires that, prior to regulation, a 
school must demonstrate actual or potential disruption to the 
educational process posed by the speech.103 This is based on a 
recognition that a school has a “compelling interest in having 
an undisrupted school session conducive to the students‟ 
 
101. J.S. ex rel H.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
102. Id. at 865 n.12. 
103. Id. at 861 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 514 (1969)). 
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learning.”104 Thus, a school may regulate student speech if 
“facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities” are present.105 Moreover, Tinker does not 
require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs 
before they may act. “„In fact, they have a duty to prevent the 
occurrence of disturbances.‟ Forecasting disruption is 
unmistakably difficult to do. Tinker does not require certainty 
that disruption will occur, „but rather the existence of facts 
which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast 
substantial disruption.‟”106 
Subsequent litigation over student websites gives some 
guidance as to the degree of disruption that must be 
demonstrated prior to regulation. At one end of the spectrum 
are cases like Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV 
School District,107 which involved a relatively mild off-campus 
website that contained unflattering comments about the 
school‟s principal. Using Tinker, the court found that the 
speech was protected and that the school could not 
demonstrate any disruption due to the website, thus 
overturning the suspension on First Amendment grounds.108 
 
104. Grayned v. City of Rockland, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972). 
105. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
106. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(internal citation omitted). 
107. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
108. Id. See also Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F.Supp.2d 
698 (W.D. Pa. 2003). Student made several postings, including one from 
school, that could fairly be characterized as a routine trash-talking about 
another school‟s volleyball team and players. Id. at 700-01. The court made 
short work of this case but used a different type of analysis. Rather than 
looking at disruption and related Tinker issues, the court overturned the 
discipline on overbreadth grounds noting that the discipline policy itself was 
overbroad as it did not “geographically limit a school official‟s authority to 
discipline expressions that occur on school premises or at school related 
activities, thus providing unrestricted power to school officials.” Id. at 705. 
See also Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of the North Canton City Sch., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Middle school student created a website for 
his skateboarding group that was maintained on his home computer. Id. at 
795. The website was not obscene per se but had some insulting sentences 
about several fellow students and was accessed at school. Id. The district 
discovered the website and suspended the student for the comments about 
fellow students. Id. at 796. The court refused to grant the school summary 
judgment on the student‟s First Amendment claims finding that it was not 
19
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Toward the middle of the spectrum is the case of Mahaffey 
ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich,109 in which the student created a 
website “for laughs,” because he was bored and “wanted 
something to do.” The website was entitled “Satan‟s web page” 
and contained statements such as: 
 
SATAN‟S MISSION FOR YOU THIS WEEK: 
Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire 
throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and 
with their last breath, just before everything 
goes black, spit on their face. Killing people is 
wrong don‟t do It. unless Im there to watch. __ 
Or just go to Detroit. Hell is right in the middle. 
Drop by and say hi. 
 
PS: NOW THAT YOU‟VE READ MY WEB PAGE 
PLEASE DON‟T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND 
 
inappropriate for a student to visit his own website which was not clearly 
obscene. Id. at 801. See also Killion v. Franklin Reg‟l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 
2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Student compiled a “Top Ten” list about the athletic 
director referring to him as fat, impugning his masculinity, and deriding the 
size of his genitals. Id. at 448. The top ten list was sent off-campus in an e-
mail but copies were later found in the teachers‟ lounge and elsewhere 
around school. Id. 448-49. Notwithstanding the fact that the e-mail did make 
its way onto school grounds, the court sided with the student: “Given the out 
of school creation of the list, absent evidence that [the student] was 
responsible for bringing the list on school grounds, and absent disruption, . . . 
[the school] could not, without violating the First Amendment, suspend [the 
student] for the mere creation of the . . . Top Ten list.” Id. at 458. See also 
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
Student created a website on his home computer entitled the “Unofficial 
Kentlake High Home Page.” Id. at 1089. The website was highly critical of 
the school‟s administration and had two mock obituaries with visitors 
encouraged to vote for the next one to “die.” Id. The local media discovered 
the site and characterized it as a Columbine type “hit list.” Id. The student 
was suspended and sued the school alleging a violation of his First 
Amendment rights. Id. The school lost as the district court found that the 
speech took place entirely off of school grounds and the school was unable to 
demonstrate any specific evidence of disruption caused by the site nor that it 
was a true threat and thus unprotected: “The defendant, however, has 
presented no evidence that the mock obituaries and voting on this web site 
were intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or 
manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.” Id. at 1090. 
109. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
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STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME. OK? 110 
 
Despite the offensive nature of the speech, the only nexus 
with the school with respect to the creation of the site was a 
statement by the student that some of the website creation 
“may have” taken place on school computers.111 The school also 
could not demonstrate any actual or potential disruption.112 As 
a consequence, “Defendants‟ regulation of Plaintiff‟s speech on 
the website without any proof of disruption to the school or on 
campus activity in the creation of the website was a violation of 
Plaintiff‟s First Amendment rights.” 113 
At the far end of the spectrum permitting discipline are 
cases like J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District.114 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the 
comments on the website did not constitute a “true threat” and 
therefore were protected speech,115 the court upheld the 
student‟s expulsion nevertheless because the school 
successfully demonstrated that the website had the potential 
for and did in fact create a substantial disruption at school.116 
This determination was based primarily on the fact that, after 
viewing the website, the math teacher singled out on the site 
missed the rest of the year due to anxiety and fear.117 
 
The web site posted by J.S. in this case disrupted 
the entire school community—teachers, students 
and parents. The most significant disruption 
caused by the positing of the web site to the 
school environment was direct and indirect 
impact of the emotional and physical injuries to 
Mrs. Fulmer. . . . Mrs. Fulmer was unable to 
complete the school year and took a medical 
leave of absence for the next year. Mrs. Fulmer‟s 
 
110. Id. at 782. 
111. Id. at 784. 
112. Id. at 785. 
113. Id. at 786. 
114. 807 A.2d 847 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
115. Id. at 867. 
116. Id. at 869. 
117. Id. 
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absence for over twenty days at the end of the 
school year necessitated the use of three 
substitute teachers that unquestionably 
disrupted the delivery of instruction to students 
and adversely impacted the education 
environment.118 
 
Taking these cases together, they seem to create a useful 
basic framework for analyzing Internet-based student free 
speech claims. Applying the Tinker analysis, assuming some 
form of nexus with the campus, a school may regulate 
electronic speech if “facts which might reasonably have led 
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities” are present.119 The 
categories most likely to apply to student Internet speech are 
usually “obscenity, certain types of defamatory speech, and 
true threats.”120 Of these, in this post-Columbine world, the 
most significant area of concern would be threats. 
However, some writers have suggested that this type of 
framework goes too far in permitting schools to punish 
students for cyberspeech, particularly in the student/student 
harassment cases. For example, one writer notes that 
“[p]resently, there is a risk that students‟ First Amendment 
rights will be infringed because courts are placing too much 
emphasis on the Columbine tragedy without considering the 
well-known adage, „kids will be kids.‟”121 The problem, of 
course, is that while kids will be kids, schools are required to 
attempt to mold them into adults, and in doing so, federal law 
requires schools to respond to and remedy inappropriate 
harassing behavior. For example, the Supreme Court in Davis 
ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education122 
held that, under Title IX, schools that are aware of peer sexual 
 
118. Id. 
119. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969). 
120. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 854 (internal citation omitted). 
121. Sandy S. Li, The Need for a New Uniform Standard: The Continued 
Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 66-67 
(2005). 
122. 526 U.S. 629, 646-47 (1999). 
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harassment and fail to adequately respond to it will be liable 
for that harassment. Similarly, the United States Department 
of Education‟s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) considers peer 
hostile environment racial harassment to be a violation of Title 
VI.123 In an October 26, 2010 “Dear Colleague” letter, OCR took 
the position that, under Title IX, schools are required to 
regulate harassing cyberspeech regardless of whether it comes 
on to school grounds or not.124 Other courts have also 
recognized a cause of action for disability-based harassment as 
well.125 In addition to these federal laws, as noted in a recent 
report by the Education Commission of the States, many states 
have adopted statutes requiring schools to develop effective 
anti-bullying policies.126 
The other problem is that while “kids will [indeed] be 
kids,” it leads to precisely the type of harassment that led to 
the Phoebe Prince suicide.127 
 
V. The Third Circuit Layshock/J.S. ex rel. H.S. Disconnect 
 
Just as it would seem from the preceding section that the 
courts are approaching some type of consensus regarding the 
regulation of student cyberspeech, on February 4, 2010, the 
Third Circuit handed down two decisions in cases with almost 
identical facts but which had dramatically different results. 
 
 
 
123. Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational 
Institutions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448, 11449 (Mar. 10, 
1994). See Bryant v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2003); 
Williams v. Port Huron Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 06-14556, 2010 WL 
1286306 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2010). 
124. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec‟y for Civil Rights, Dep‟t of 
Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Education Colleagues (Oct. 26, 2010), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201010.pdf. 
125. K.M. ex rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
126. See Jennifer Dounay, State Anti-bullying Statutes, EDUCATION 
COMMISSION OF THE STATES (April 2005), 
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/41/6041.doc. 
127. Li, supra note 125, at 67. 
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A.  Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District 
 
In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District,128 Justin Layshock, a senior at Hickory High School, 
created a fake profile of his principal, Eric Trosch, on 
MySpace.com, using his grandmother‟s off-campus computer 
during non-school hours.129 Although no school resources were 
used to create the profile, Layshock copied, without permission, 
a photograph of Mr. Trosch from the school‟s website and used 
it in the profile.130 In addition to the usual juvenile sexual 
comments, the parody stated that the principal was a drunk 
and contained comments that he had stolen a “big keg,” that he 
was “too drunk to remember” the date of his birthday, and that 
he smoked marijuana and used other drugs.131 Principal Trosch 
testified that he “believed all of the profiles were „degrading,‟ 
„demeaning,‟ „demoralizing,‟ and „shocking.‟”132 
Layshock told a few friends about the profile but 
eventually “word of the profile „spread like wildfire‟ and soon 
reached most, if not all, of Hickory High‟s student body.”133 
Following Layshock‟s initial profile “three other students also 
posted unflattering profiles of Trosch on MySpace. Each of 
those profiles was more vulgar and more offensive than 
Justin‟s. . . . On December 15, Justin used a computer in his 
Spanish classroom to access his MySpace profile of Trosch. He 
also showed it to other classmates . . . .”134 
Principal Trosch discovered the profiles but was initially 
unable to block student access because “the Technology 
Coordinator[] was on vacation . . . . Instead, student use of 
computers was limited to labs or the library where it could be 
supervised.”135 Computer access was limited for more than a 
 
128. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated 
by No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
129. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 253. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
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week “and computer programming classes were cancelled.”136 
School administrators eventually learned that Layshock was 
behind the profile and he was given a “ten-day, out-of-school 
suspension,” banned from extra-curricular activities, placed in 
the alternative education program, and was not allowed to 
attend graduation ceremonies.137 
Layshock and his parents sued the school, arguing that the 
punishment violated his First Amendment rights and their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.138 The district court granted 
Layshock summary judgment on his First Amendment claim, 
finding that the school had violated his rights, and granted the 
school summary judgment on the parents‟ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims.139 The parties cross-appealed the 
decisions.140 
The Third Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the 
Tinker/Bethel/Hazelwood trilogy and stating that, under this 
framework, “it is important to note that the district court found 
that the District could not „establish[] a sufficient nexus 
between Justin‟s speech and a substantial disruption of the 
school environment[,]‟ and the School District[] does not 
challenge that finding on appeal.”141 Instead, the school focused 
its argument on appeal on the Fraser/Morse lewd and vulgar 
standard because it believed the case was an on-campus speech 
case.142 In support of this, the school noted that the speech 
started on school grounds when Layshock “stole” the picture of 
Principal Trosch and ended on school grounds when Layshock 
accessed the site in Spanish class and showed it to his 
friends.143 The school argued that, because the profile was on-
campus speech that was lewd and vulgar and ran contrary to 
the school‟s basic educational mission, under Fraser/Morse the 
school could regulate the speech.144 
 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 254. 
138. Id. at 252. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 255. 
141. Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted). 
142. Id. at 261. 
143. See id. at 259. 
144. Id. 
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The Third Circuit panel decision seems to have 
misunderstood this argument and confused the Fraser/Morse 
analysis with the Tinker substantial disruption standard. As 
discussed earlier, under Fraser/Morse a school may regulate 
lewd or vulgar on-campus speech regardless of disruption: “The 
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would 
undermine the school‟s basic educational mission.”145 
Nevertheless, the Layshock panel seems to have rested its 
decision on the fact that the school could not show substantial 
disruption: 
 
Moreover, when pressed at oral argument, 
counsel for the School District conceded that the 
District was relying solely on the fact that Justin 
created the profile of Trosch. We have found no 
authority that would support punishment for 
creating such a profile unless it results in 
foreseeable and substantial disruption of 
school.146 
 
This statement is simply incorrect and ignores the 
Fraser/Morse framework as well as Tinker itself. 
 
145. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
146. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263. This concession is 
troubling, since it appears that there was indeed significant disruption as a 
consequence of the profile. As the district court noted: “However, Defendants 
presented considerable evidence that Plaintiff‟s website caused actual 
disruption of the day-to-day operation of Hickory High School from December 
12 through December 21, 2005. Justin‟s parody of [the principal], as well as 
the other parodies of unknown origin, were accessed incessantly by students 
at Hickory High School, which in turn caused the school to shut down its 
computer system to student use from December 16 through December 21, 
2005. The lack of access to the computer system caused the cancellation of 
several classes and interfered with students‟ ability to use the computers for 
their school-intended purposes. During this period of time Frank Gingras, the 
school district‟s technology coordinator, was required to devote approximately 
25% of his time to dealing with the disruption caused by the profiles at 
www.myspace.com. This time was consumed by attempts to block the 
numerous addresses from which students were attempting to access the 
profiles on school computers, as well as efforts to install additional firewall 
protections on the school‟s computer system.” Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
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To the extent that the panel in Layshock even considered 
the Fraser/Morse framework, it seems to ignore the fact that 
Layshock himself admitted accessing the website at school and 
showing it to several friends. This despite the fact that the 
panel opinion itself notes that “[o]n December 15, Justin used a 
computer in his Spanish classroom to access his MySpace 
profile of Trosch. He also showed it to other classmates . . . .”147 
It is difficult to understand, given this statement, how the 
panel could then conclude that “[t]here is no evidence that 
Justin engaged in any lewd or profane speech while in 
school.”148 In fact this statement seems to run contrary to the 
caption of one section of the panel opinion: “The District can 
not Punish Justin Merely because his Speech Reached inside 
the School.”149 It seems as if the panel assumed that accessing 
a website Layshock himself created and showing it to other 
students is not “speech.” If so, this position makes no sense 
given the Supreme Court‟s broad view of speech, written, 
spoken, and expressive. 
This flawed assumption appears to underlie the panel‟s 
decision to treat this case as an off-campus speech case which 
drove its resolution of the matter: “[T]he District is not 
empowered to punish his out of school expressive conduct 
under the circumstances here.”150 
 
It would be an unseemly and dangerous 
precedent to allow the state in the guise of school 
authorities to reach into a child‟s home and 
control his/her actions there to the same extent 
that they can control that child when he/she 
participates in school sponsored activities. 
Allowing the District to punish Justin for 
conduct he engaged in using his grandmother‟s 
computer while at his grandmother‟s house 
 
147. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253. 
148. Id. at 260 (quoting Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. 
Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599-600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)). 
149. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260. 
150. Id. at 263. 
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would create just such a precedent . . . .151 
 
The fact that the panel opted to treat the case as an off-campus 
speech case, ignoring the fact that Layshock accessed the site 
at school and showed it to his friends, undermines the opinion 
and is likely one of the reasons that rehearing was granted and 
the opinion was vacated. 
 
B.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District 
 
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,152 
J.S., a female eighth grader at Blue Mountain Middle School, 
created a fake profile of her principal, James McGonigle, on 
MySpace.com using her parents‟ computer. The URL for the 
profile was http://www.myspace.com/kidsrockmybed.153 
Although no school resources were used to create the profile, 
J.S. did copy, without permission, a photograph of Mr. 
McGonigle from the school‟s website and used it in the fake 
profile.154 According to the court‟s description: 
 
[S]he created from her home computer a 
MySpace.com Internet profile featuring her 
principal, James McGonigle. The profile did not 
state McGonigle‟s name, but included his 
photograph from the website of Blue Mountain 
School District (the “School District”), as well as 
profanity-laced statements insinuating that he 
was a sex addict and pedophile.155 
 
Gems from this profile noted in the court‟s decision include: 
 
[A] self-portrayal of a middle school principal 
named “m-hoe=].” The profile‟s owner described 
 
151. Id. at 260. 
152. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated 
by No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
153. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 290. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
210 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
himself as a married bisexual forty-year-old man 
. . . . His “Interests” section read as follows: . . . 
“fucking in my office. hitting on students and 
their parents.” . . . Another section, entitled 
“About me” stated: 
 
“HELLO CHILDREN 
 
yes. it‟s your oh so wonderful, hairy, 
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this 
world with a small dick 
 
PRINCIPAL 
 
I have come to myspace so i can pervert the 
minds of other principal‟s to be just like me.156 
 
J.S. discussed the site with several friends the day after she 
created it, and although it was originally a public site available 
to everyone, she later made it private, accessible only to those 
she allowed.157 Unlike Layshock, there was no evidence that the 
site was ever accessed at school.158 However, the website did 
create some minor disruption at school.159 
J.S. was suspended for ten days and sued the school, 
alleging that her suspension for the off-campus website 
violated her First Amendment rights.160 
 
The District Court acknowledged that J.S. 
created the profile at home, and determined that 
it did not substantially and materially disrupt 
school so as to satisfy the Tinker standard, 
although it did cause some disruption. However, 
the District Court ultimately held that, based on 
 
156. Id. at 291. 
157. See id. at 292. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. at 293-94. 
160. See id. at 294-95. 
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the facts of the case and “because the lewd and 
vulgar off-campus speech had an effect on-
campus,” the School District did not violate J.S.‟s 
First Amendment rights by disciplining her.161 
 
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel began its analysis by noting 
that the Fraser/Morse framework was inapplicable162 
“[b]ecause the Middle School computers block access to 
MySpace, students could have viewed the profile only from an 
off-campus location.”163 Thus, this case was not an on-campus 
speech case. The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel then turned to the 
Tinker substantial disruption analysis.164 However, this panel 
of the Third Circuit took a far different view of substantial 
disruption than the Layshock panel had. As noted earlier, it 
appears that the Layshock panel held that Tinker requires a 
showing that the profile actually “results in foreseeable and 
substantial disruption of school.”165 
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel viewed the Tinker showing 
differently: 
 
Yet, school authorities need not wait until a 
substantial disruption actually occurs in order to 
curb the offending speech if they are able to 
“demonstrate any facts which might reasonably 
have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption 
of or material interference with school activities.” 
. . . 
Our sister courts of appeals offer further support 
for the notion that a school may meet its burden 
of showing a substantial disruption through its 
well-founded belief that future disruption will 
occur.166 
 
161. Id. at 295 (citation omitted). 
162. See id. at 297-98. 
163. Id. at 292. 
164. See id. at 298. 
165. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 
263 (3d Cir. 2010). 
166. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298-99 (internal citation omitted). 
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Within this framework, the J.S. ex rel Snyder panel first 
looked to the three items of actual disruption that the school 
cited in favor of the discipline (loud classes, administrative 
resources used to investigate and discipline, and decorated 
lockers supporting the student) and found them wanting.167 
“[W]e would have no trouble concluding, as the District Court 
did, that these incidents did not amount to a substantial 
disruption of the Middle School sufficient to discipline the 
students for their speech.”168 However, the J.S. ex rel Snyder 
panel did not stop there; it then looked to whether the site had 
the potential to cause disruption: 
 
[T]he profile‟s potential to cause a substantial 
disruption of the school was reasonably 
foreseeable. It is apparent that the underlying 
cause for McGonigle‟s concern about the profile 
was its particularly disturbing content, not a 
petty desire to stifle speech critical of him, and 
we proceed with our analysis with this in mind. 
Therefore, we are sufficiently persuaded that the 
profile presented a reasonable possibility of a 
future disruption, which was preempted only by 
McGonigle‟s expeditious investigation of the 
profile, which secured its quick removal, and his 
swift punishment of its creators.169 
 
 The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel concluded that “based on the 
profile‟s nature and its threat of substantial disruption of the 
Middle School, that the School District did not offend J.S.‟s 
First Amendment free speech rights by punishing her for 
creating the profile.”170 
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel recognized the apparent 
tension between its decision and the decision in Layshock 
handed down the same day and attempted to distinguish the 
cases based on the fact that, in Layshock, the school 
 
167. Id. at 309-10. 
168. Id. at 299. 
169. Id. at 300. 
170. Id. at 303. 
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purportedly conceded the Tinker disruption test and could not 
meet the on-campus requirement of Fraser/Morse.171 
Nonetheless, recognizing the inherent tension in J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder and Layshock, Third Circuit granted requests for 
rehearing en banc in both cases on April 9, 2010.172 Oral 
argument took place on June 3, 2010. As of the date of this 
article no decision has been rendered by the Third Circuit on 
these cases.173 
 
VI. Finding the “Magic Bullet” 
 
 Given the extremely unsettled state of the law in this 
area, is it any wonder that the school administrators in South 
Hadley were at somewhat of a loss with respect to how to deal 
with the situation? According to a Boston Globe report quoting 
South Hadley Superintendent Gus Sayer: “The kids have a way 
of communicating with each other without us knowing about it. 
. . . They really have their own world.”174 He went on to say 
that “I think the principal did everything he could. . . . 
Everyone expects the schools to solve these problems, but we 
don‟t have magic-bullet solutions to how kids behave.”175 It is 
perhaps no surprise that the Prince family filed a complaint 
against the school which was eventually settled.176 
 When you have two panels of learned jurists releasing 
contrary opinions on similar facts on the same day, there is an 
obvious need for clarity in this area. While there is no “magic-
bullet,” as the courts address these issues, there are three 
specific areas where clarification would help school 
 
171. Id. at 296-98. 
172. See id., reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated by No. 08-4138, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated by No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 
2010). 
173. Robson, supra note 15. 
174. Schworm, supra note 9, at 2 (internal citation omitted). 
175. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
176. Andrea Canning et al., Phoebe Prince‟s Family Speaks Out as One 
Year Anniversary of Suicide Nears, ABCNEWS.COM, Dec. 23, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/phoebe-princes-family-speaks-settling-lawsuit-
school/story?id=12465543&page=2. 
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administrators avoid tragedies like that of Phoebe Prince. 
First, school administrators need clarification on what 
constitutes on-campus speech under the Fraser/Morse 
framework. Second, school administrators need guidance on 
the application of the Tinker substantial disruption test and, 
more specifically, whether the “reasonably foreseeable” 
standard applies. Third, schools need to know if there is an 
alternative framework that may be more appropriate to apply 
to the sub-set of cyberbullying cases. 
 
A. On-campus Speech Under the Fraser/Morse Framework 
 
As noted earlier, one of the oddities of the Layshock 
decision is the panel‟s failure to give due weight to the fact that 
“[o]n December 15, Justin used a computer in his Spanish 
classroom to access his MySpace profile of Trosch. He also 
showed it to other classmates . . . .”177 Given this fact, just as in 
Morse, the case should have been a rather routine on-campus 
speech case requiring a rather formulaic application of the 
Fraser framework. Yet the panel chose not to do so and instead 
tried to create an artificial distinction to differentiate between 
the act of speaking (i.e. creating the website) and the act of 
accessing the website at school and showing it to friends.178 The 
panel opinion apparently refers to the second as not being an 
act of speech, noting that the District could not punish Justin 
just because his speech reached inside the school.179 
The artificial distinction in Layshock with respect to on-
campus speech runs counter to Morse. In Morse the decision 
turned on the location of the speech. The Supreme Court held 
that the student unfurled his banner on-campus” at a school 
event.180 Having reached that conclusion, the Supreme Court 
determined that Fraser applied and the school could restrict 
speech inconsistent with its educational mission.181 The 
Supreme Court did not look to where the student created his 
 
177. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253. 
178. Id. at 259. 
179. Id. at 260. 
180. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007). 
181. See generally id. 
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banner (almost certainly off of school grounds). Instead the 
Supreme Court focused on where he unfurled it, in that case 
“on campus.”182 Having found that the banner was unfurled at 
school (an act of speech), under Morse that is the end of the on-
campus inquiry—the speech took place at school, Fraser 
applies, and a school may regulate speech inconsistent with its 
education mission regardless of disruption.183 
Given the manner in which the Supreme Court handled 
the speech in Morse, the Layshock panel decision is incorrect. 
Under Morse the issue of where the speech was created is 
irrelevant. Instead, the key focus is on whether any of the 
speech took place or was accessed at school. Thus, in Layshock, 
the analysis should have been relatively simple. Layshock 
admitted that he accessed the website at school and showed it 
to classmates.184 He metaphorically unfurled his banner at 
school by accessing the website and showing it to friends in 
exactly the same fashion as the student unfurled his banner in 
Morse. As a consequence, as in Morse, once there is evidence 
that the website was accessed at school: “The question thus 
becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First 
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when 
that speech is reasonably viewed as [undermining the school‟s 
basic educational mission]. We hold that she may.”185 
Thus, Layshock notwithstanding, it would seem clear that 
if school administrators have evidence that the harassing 
materials (texts, Facebook postings of other websites) have 
been accessed at school, the Fraser/Morse framework applies 
and the school has broad discretion to punish students for that 
speech regardless of the Tinker disruption standard. This is 
consistent with J.S. ex rel. Snyder, which notes that in the age 
of the worldwide web, “J.S.‟s argument for a strict application 
of Tinker, limited to the physical boundaries of school 
campuses, is unavailing.”186 Thus, as applied to the Phoebe 
 
182. Id. at 397. 
183. See generally id. 
184. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253. 
185. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (parenthetical text inserted from Bethel Sch. 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
186. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
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Prince case, once the South Hadley administrators had 
evidence that the speech was accessed at school, the 
administrators should have had the full panoply of disciplinary 
tools available to punish the cyberbullies regardless of where 
the speech was originally created. 
 
B. The “Reasonably Foreseeable” and “Substantial Disruption” 
Standards Under Tinker 
 
 The second area of concern for school administrators that 
crops up in cyberbullying cases, where there is no evidence that 
the speech occurs on-campus and the Tinker framework 
applies, involves the application of the substantial disruption 
standard. The Layshock opinion appears to stand for the 
proposition that school administrators cannot regulate 
cyberspeech unless they can show actual disruption. The J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder opinion rejects this proposition, noting that “[o]ur 
sister courts of appeals offer further support for the notion that 
a school may meet its burden of showing a substantial 
disruption through its well-founded belief that future 
disruption will occur.”187 
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder opinion certainly seems to have the 
better of the argument, with most cases recognizing that the 
substantial disruption standard is not limited to actual 
disruption, but instead applies where a school can show “a 
well-founded expectation of disruption.”188 Thus, under this 
characterization of the Tinker framework, South Hadley 
administrators could have disciplined the cyberbullies for their 
speech if they could “demonstrate any facts which might 
reasonably have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption of 
or material interference with school activities . . . .”189 
This framework is helpful with incidents like Internet 
bomb threats and related activities, but how well does it apply 
to the Phoebe Prince situation where there is no dispute that 
the cyberspeech caused actual substantial disruption to her but 
 
187. Id. at 299. 
188. Id. at 298 (internal citation omitted). 
189. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969). 
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not to anyone else or to the school in general. This is an issue 
where guidance is sorely needed. While the reasonably 
foreseeable substantial disruption standard works well in some 
cases, it is not clear that disruption of one student‟s education 
is sufficient to meet this standard. 
As noted earlier, according to District Attorney Scheibel, 
“[t]he investigation revealed relentless activity directed toward 
Phoebe, designed to humiliate her and to make it impossible for 
her to remain at school . . . . The bullying, for her, became 
intolerable.”190 This cyberharassment did not cause a 
substantial disruption to the school as a whole, but it utterly 
disrupted Phoebe Prince‟s educational environment. Is this 
enough? 
 
C. “Invasion of the Rights of Others” as a Basis for Regulation 
 
A close examination of Tinker does reveal one potential 
method for addressing the Phoebe Prince situation where the 
cyberspeech is directed at a single student and thus disrupts 
her educational environment but nothing else: 
 
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, 
which for any reason—whether it stems from 
time, place, or type of behavior—materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, 
of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.191 
 
The Confederate Flag cases also seem to provide some 
support for the “invasion of the rights of others”192 prong of 
Tinker although they have all been ultimately resolved on the 
substantial disruption prong. Thus for example, in Barr v. 
Lafon,193 while the Sixth Circuit held that the school could ban 
a depiction of the Confederate Flag based on the potential for 
 
190. Goldman, supra note 1 (internal citation omitted). 
191. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). 
192. Id. 
193. 538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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disruption due to racial conflict, the court also noted: “Unlike in 
Tinker, Plaintiffs-Appellants‟ free-speech rights „colli[de] with 
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.‟”194 
There is a significant downside to expanding the use of the 
“invasion of the rights of others” prong of Tinker to non-tort 
speech. Mediating the collision between one set of students‟ 
free speech rights and a second set of students‟ right to be left 
alone is frequently a tough line to navigate and can lead to a 
“heckler‟s veto.” For example, in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian 
Prairie School District No. 204,195 a student was restricted from 
wearing a t-shirt with the slogan “Be Happy, Not Gay” based 
on the fact that it might offend certain LGBT students.196 In a 
fascinating opinion exploring the boundaries of the substantial 
disruption standard and the fighting words doctrine, the 
Seventh Circuit ultimately held that “„Be Happy, Not Gay‟ is 
only tepidly negative; „derogatory‟ or „demeaning‟ seems too 
strong a characterization” and thus the school could not justify 
banning the t-shirt based on a “tendency to provoke such 
[homophobic] incidents, or for that matter to poison the 
educational atmosphere.”197 Therefore the court held that the 
student was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that 
the school would violate his First Amendment rights by 
preventing him from wearing his t-shirt.198 
The only case to address this issue directly is an older 
Eighth Circuit case, Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High 
School Independent School District No. 14,199 where the court, 
citing Tinker, noted that “[t]he First Amendment rights of 
students do not extend to expression that „involves . . . invasion 
of the rights of others,‟ and . . . we read this phrase as including 
only „that speech [which] could result in tort liability.‟”200 In 
Harper v. Poway Unified School District,201 Judge Kozinski, in 
 
194. Id. at 568 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). See also Defoe ex rel. 
Defoe v. Spiva, 650 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
195. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
196. Id. at 676. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987). 
200. Id. at 752 (internal citation omitted). 
201. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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a dissenting opinion, also briefly noted this provision in Tinker: 
 
Tinker does contain an additional ground for 
banning student speech, namely where it is an 
“invasion of the rights of others.” . . . The 
interaction between harassment law and the 
First Amendment is a difficult and unsettled one 
because much of what harassment law seeks to 
prohibit, the First Amendment seems to 
protect.202 
 
Even if the “invasion of the rights of others” prong of 
Tinker is limited, as Bystrom suggests, to tort-like actions, this 
would certainly seem to be fertile ground for school 
administrators wishing to utilize a school‟s disciplinary code to 
punish the type of harassment directed towards Phoebe Prince. 
Moreover, to the extent that the harassment of Phoebe 
Prince consisted of threats of violence towards her, it is highly 
likely that those threats would not have been protected under 
Tinker. As noted earlier, the first step in any First Amendment 
analysis is to consider whether the speech itself is protected.203 
Thus, with harassing or threatening cyberspeech, the initial 
inquiry is whether the speech itself is even protected. In Watts 
v. United States,204 the Supreme Court recognized that threats 
of violence are generally not protected by the First 
Amendment.205 In Watts, the Court noted that there may be 
some political or social value associated with threatening words 
in some circumstances;206 however, the Court has also noted 
that the government has an overriding interest in “protecting 
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that 
fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened 
violence will occur . . . .”207 The issue then becomes 
 
202. Id. at 1197-98 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
203. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969). 
204. 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
205. Id. at 707-08. 
206. Id. at 707. 
207. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
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distinguishing “[w]hat is a threat . . . from what is 
constitutionally protected speech.”208 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Watts declined to set 
out a test for determining what constitutes a “true threat” and 
the courts of appeals that have announced such a test fall into 
two camps. Courts agree on an objective test that focuses on 
whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported 
threat as a serious expression of intent to cause a present or 
future harm. However, their views diverge in determining from 
whose viewpoint the statement should be interpreted.209 Some 
ask whether a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the 
speaker would foresee that the recipient would perceive the 
statement as a threat,210 whereas others ask how a reasonable 
person standing in the recipient‟s shoes would view the alleged 
threat.211 If a communication is deemed to be a “true threat,” 
then under Tinker the student may be punished without regard 
to First Amendment concerns.212 
One of the first cases to address the true threat analysis in 
conjunction with a First Amendment challenge in the school 
context was the Ninth Circuit case of Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. 
Poway Unified School District.213 In that case, a student 
threatened her guidance counselor, stating that she would 
shoot the counselor if her schedule was not changed.214 The 
student was suspended for threatening her counselor and 
challenged the suspension as violative of her First Amendment 
rights.215 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that the 
hallmark of a true threat is whether the victim had reason to 
believe that the maker of the threat would follow through with 
it.216 In reviewing the context of the speech, the Ninth Circuit 
 
208. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
209. Compare Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. 
Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), with United States 
v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 968 (1994). 
210. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1080. 
211. Malik, 16 F.3d at 49. 
212. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856 
(Pa. 2002). 
213. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996). 
214. Id. at 368. 
215. See id. at 369-70. 
216. See id. at 372. 
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held that the counselor did indeed have reason to believe the 
student might follow through, and therefore it was a true 
threat and not protected by the First Amendment.217 
The Eighth Circuit case of Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski 
County Special School District218 provides an interesting 
backdrop for this discussion. In that case, “[f]rustrated by [a] 
breakup and upset that K.G. would not go out with him again, 
J.M. drafted two violent, misogynic, and obscenity-laden rants 
expressing a desire to molest, rape, and murder K.G.”219 
According to the student, the letters were not intended to be 
given to his former girlfriend but instead were intended to be 
put to music as part of a rap song.220 The student told his ex-
girlfriend about the letter, and she arranged to have a mutual 
friend obtain a copy.221 The mutual friend took the letter 
without permission and gave it to the ex-girlfriend at school.222 
The ex-girlfriend read the letter with friends during gym class 
and one of them took it to the school resource officer who then 
advised administrators.223 After investigating the situation the 
school expelled the author for one year under a school policy 
that read: “Students shall not, with the purpose of terrorizing 
another person, threaten to cause death or serious physical 
injury or substantial property damage to another person . . . 
.”224 
The student challenged the expulsion, arguing that the 
letters were protected by the First Amendment.225 The school 
responded that they were not protected because they 
constituted a “true threat.”226 The Eighth Circuit first looked to 
the intent to communicate prong and the student‟s argument 
that his letters were not a threat because he never intended to 
 
217. See id. at 372-73. 
218. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002). 
219. Id. at 619. 
220. See id. at 619, 624. 
221. See id. at 619. 
222. See id. at 619-20. 
223. See id. at 620. 
224. Id. at 620 n.2. 
225. See id. 
226. See id. 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
222 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
communicate them to his ex-girlfriend.227 The Eighth Circuit 
rejected this argument, noting as follows: 
 
In determining whether a statement amounts to 
an unprotected threat, there is no requirement 
that the speaker intended to carry out the threat, 
nor is there any requirement that the speaker 
was capable of carrying out the purported threat 
of violence. However, the speaker must have 
intentionally or knowingly communicated the 
statement in question to someone before he or 
she may be punished or disciplined for it. The 
requirement is satisfied if the speaker 
communicates the statement to the object of the 
purported threat or to a third party.228 
 
In that case, the Eighth Circuit determined that, because the 
author allowed the mutual friend to see the letter knowing he 
would likely tell the ex-girlfriend and indeed actually told her 
about the letter himself, this conduct was sufficient to meet the 
intent to communicate prong of the true threat analysis.229 
The Eighth Circuit then turned to the “reasonable 
recipient” analysis, which looks to whether the “recipient would 
have perceived the letter as a threat.”230 
 
There is no question that the contents of the 
letter itself expressed an intent to harm K.G., 
and we disagree entirely, but respectfully, with 
the district court‟s assessment that the words 
contained in it were only “arguably” threatening. 
The letter exhibited J.M.‟s pronounced, 
contemptuous and depraved hate for K.G. J.M. 
referred to or described K.G. as a “bitch,” “slut,” 
“ass,” and a “whore” over 80 times in only four 
pages. He used the f-word no fewer than ninety 
 
227. See id. at 624. 
228. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
229. See id. at 624-25. 
230. Id. at 625. 
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times and spoke frequently in the letter of his 
wish to sodomize, rape, and kill K.G. The most 
disturbing aspect of the letter, however, is J.M.‟s 
warning in two passages, expressed in 
unconditional terms, that K.G. should not go to 
sleep because he would be lying under her bed 
waiting to kill her with a knife. Most, if not all, 
normal thirteen-year-old girls (and probably 
most reasonable adults) would be frightened by 
the message and tone of J.M.‟s letter and would 
fear for their physical well-being if they received 
the same letter.231 
 
The ex-girlfriend also testified that she was terrified and 
resorted to sleeping with the light on.232 She also left school 
early when he was reinstated because she feared meeting him 
there.233 As a consequence, the Eighth Circuit found that a 
reasonable recipient would have viewed the letters as a 
threat.234 “As such, the letter amounted to a true threat, and 
the school‟s administrators and the school board did not violate 
J.M.‟s First Amendment rights by initiating disciplinary action 
based on the letter‟s threatening content.”235 
Because the Eighth Circuit resolved the case on a “true 
threat” basis, finding that the speech was not protected under 
the first prong of Tinker, it did not reach the disruption 
element.236 However, it should be noted that there was strong 
 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 626. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
235. Id. at 626-27. A similar result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in 
LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., where a student wrote a poem 
which described in graphic terms his killing of twenty-eight (28) fellow 
students and his intent to either commit suicide or go on to kill more 
students. 257 F.3d 981, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2001). The student turned the poem 
in to his English teacher to get her thoughts on the poem. Id. at 984. The 
teacher turned the poem in to the vice principal and the student was 
eventually expelled for the poem. Id. at 984-86. The student challenged the 
expulsion. See id. at 986. The court noted that given the spate of recent school 
shootings “we cannot fault the school‟s response.” Id. at 990. 
236. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 
616, 622-24 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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disagreement as to whether these letters were a “true 
threat.”237 As noted above, the district court did not believe that 
they were, nor did the initial Eighth Circuit panel hearing the 
case.238 Moreover, four members of the Eighth Circuit dissented 
from the en banc decision, arguing that the letters were not a 
true threat because the student never intended to communicate 
the threat directly to the ex-girlfriend.239 Because they found 
that the speech was protected under the first prong of Tinker, 
the dissenters in Doe then turned to the second prong. While 
citing the disruption standard, they chose instead to simply 
focus on what it felt was a disproportionate punishment: “The 
board‟s draconian punishment is unprecedented among the 
school threat cases across the nation.”240 
Because the dissenters focused on the magnitude of the 
punishment and not the ability to punish under the First 
Amendment it is difficult to tell if they found that the school 
had the power to restrict J.M.‟s speech under the second prong 
of Tinker, 241 the “invasion of the rights of others” provision. 
In Doe, even if the majority had found that the letters did 
not constitute a “true threat,” there is no doubt that these 
letters precluded the ex-girlfriend from receiving the benefits of 
a public education free from sexual harassment, a right 
guaranteed by Title IX.242 Thus J.M.‟s letters, even though they 
were protected speech under the first prong of Tinker, are still 
subject to restriction under the second prong of Tinker because 
they represent an invasion of the rights of others, and 
specifically ex-girlfriend‟s right to attend school free of peer 
sexual harassment. Indeed, had the school not acted to resolve 
the situation, the school itself would be liable for that same 
peer sexual harassment under Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education.243 
Utilizing this framework may provide school 
 
237. Id. 
238. See id. at 619. 
239. See generally id. at 627-36. 
240. Id. at 635 (Heany, J., dissenting). 
241. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969). 
242. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2010). 
243. See generally 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
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administrators with the “magic bullet” for responding to 
cyberharassment cases such as Phoebe Prince even where the 
speech is arguably protected under the first prong of Tinker.244 
Of course, in order to show an “invasion of the rights of others,” 
the school would have to show that the individual conduct 
arises to the level of actionable peer harassment under Davis. 
The standard in Davis is sufficiently high that this alone would 
likely prevent abuse by schools while at the same time 
permitting discipline where warranted and in order to protect 
the student that is the target of the harassment.245 
This focus on the invasion of the rights of other students 
does not limit discipline to cases of sexual or racial harassment 
 
244. The need for such a framework is clear. See Jones v. State, 64 
S.W.3d 728 (Ark. 2002) (Arkansas Supreme Court found that a rap song from 
one student to another that described the killing of the recipient and her 
family constituted a true threat). See also In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 
2001). A 13 year old student told other students at a local youth center that 
he “was going to kill everyone at the middle school” and provided graphic 
details of how he was going to “make people suffer” and rape a classmate. Id. 
at 715. He challenged his conviction for disorderly conduct arguing that his 
speech was not a true threat, but was instead mere “trash talking” protected 
by the First Amendment. Id. at 716. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected 
this argument finding that “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, a 
reasonable speaker in the position of A.S. would foresee that reasonable 
listeners would interpret his statements as serious expressions of an intent to 
intimidate or inflict bodily harm.” Id. at 720. But see In re C.C.H., 651 
N.W.2d 702 (S.D. 2002). South Dakota Supreme Court found that a student‟s 
statement to a teacher that “he wanted to kill [B.C.]” was not a true threat. 
Id. at 704, 708. However, this case relied heavily on the original Doe v. 
Pulaski decision which was later reversed. Id. at 706-07. See In re Douglas 
D., 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001) (Wisconsin Supreme Court finding that story 
about a teacher‟s head being cutoff was not a true threat). 
245. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53 (noting that the “provision that the 
discrimination occur „under any education program or activity‟ suggests that 
the behavior be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the 
victim equal access to an educational program or activity. Although, in 
theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment 
could be said to have such an effect, we think it unlikely that Congress would 
have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of the 
inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be 
invited by entertaining claims of official indifference to a single instance of 
one-on-one peer harassment. By limiting private damages actions to cases 
having a systemic effect on educational programs or activities, we reconcile 
the general principle that Title IX prohibits official indifference to known 
peer sexual harassment with the practical realities of responding to student 
behavior, realities that Congress could not have meant to be ignored.”). 
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but can also extend to other protected categories such as 
disability or sexual orientation. For example, the Supreme 
Court, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,246 noted 
that the Title VII prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” 
protects men from sexual harassment by other men. Moreover, 
several courts have held that taunts of “queer” create an 
actionable hostile work environment and presumably would be 
viewed in the same way at school.247 
Taking this approach and applying it to the type of 
cyberbullying that was directed towards Phoebe Prince seems a 
logical fit. For example, it is alleged that the bullies used 
Facebook to post messages that called Phoebe Prince a “slut,” 
as well as other messages that were so severe and pervasive 
that they made it impossible for her to attend school.248 
Presumably, if South Hadley were aware of these postings, it 
could have disciplined the students under the foregoing 
framework for invading her rights and impairing her ability to 
receive an education. Even if the students were to argue, as the 
student did in Doe, that these comments were not “directed” at 
Prince because they were just general Facebook postings, Doe 
stands for the proposition that the school administrators may 
treat them as directed to Phoebe Prince and discipline them for 
the postings nevertheless. The burden of course would be to 
demonstrate that the comments were sufficiently severe and 
pervasive to impair the students‟ right to a public education 
under Davis. If such a showing can be made, then it is likely 
that the speech may be restricted under the Tinker “invasion of 
the right of others” language. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
As the Phoebe Prince suicide demonstrates, the impact of 
cyberharassment on individual students can be both profound 
 
246. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
247. See, e.g., Whelan v. Albertson's, Inc., 879 P.2d 888, 891 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1994) (repeated taunts of “queer” and “Serge” in front of customers and 
co-workers). 
248. Jessica Bennett, From Lockers to Lockup, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2010, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/04/phoebe-prince-should-bullying-be-a-
crime.html. 
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and deadly. Unfortunately, the tools available to school 
administrators to deal with such speech are not yet fully 
formed. It is difficult to expect school administrators such as 
those in South Hadley to quickly and effectively respond to this 
type of harassment when their legal ability to do so rests in 
such murky waters. When two panels of the Third Circuit, on 
essentially the same facts, come to exactly opposite conclusions 
as to the ability of schools to discipline for this type of speech, 
how can we expect non-lawyer school administrators to 
navigate these waters? 
It is clearly incumbent on the courts, particularly the en 
banc Third Circuit and eventually the Supreme Court, to 
cleanse these waters and give school administrators both the 
tools and guidance as to how to apply those tools to situations 
like the Phoebe Prince case. This is particularly so in the areas 
of the definition of “on campus” speech, the gravity and nature 
of the Tinker substantial disruption standard, and the 
application of the Tinker “invasion of the rights of others” 
prong. Until these waters are cleansed, the potential for 
tragedies such as the Phoebe Prince suicide remain. 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
